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I. PERSPECTIVE A N D SCOPE 
The world food shortage, the world fertilizer and agrochemicals shortage, world in-
flation, and the extremity of Sri Lanka 's foreign exchange crisis combine to make a case for 
reviewing the classical green revolution strategy for increasing food output . The difficulties 
and costs of import ing fertilizers and agrochemicals force and demand a reappraisal of the 
potential of domestic resources and of a strategy of greater self-reliance. In any such re-
appraisal , two inputs can easily be ignored: the first is water; the second is political and ad-
ministrative will. Neither is imported; neither has any foreign exchange component . But, 
I shall argue, these two have a high degree of complementarity as inputs into dry zone irri-
gation and they have a substantial potential for increasing food product ion and thereby 
reducing imports. If they are not exploited, let it not be because that potential is unknown 
or is no t recognised by political leaders and administrators. An at tempt to open up and 
explore a range of questions concerning water management in general and in the dry zone 
in part icular has been made in an earlier paper [Chambers, 1974]. The purpose now is to 
concentrate on a narrower band of topics and to try to derive practical prescriptions f rom that 
analysis. This narrower band is those aspects of dry zone irrigation where there is most 
potential for increasing food production and thereby saving foreign exchange through a 
combinat ion of water management and political and administrative will. This limits the 
discussion to irrigation on which water distribution is mediated through a bureaucracy, that 
is to say, to major irrigation. Minor irrigation, though impor tant in terms of area and pro-
duction, is managed by communities normally without any bureaucratic or external political 
intervention. The crop mainly considered is paddy since in the short and medium term this is 
likely to be the principal irrigated crop in the dry zone. Current work on growing other 
crops on dry zone irrigation, and especially alternative crops to paddy in yahhas very 
considerable long-term importance. But in a situation of crisis one must go for the imme-
diate chance which in this case is increasing the production of paddy. 
A basic premise is that water in the dry zone is generally more limiting than land. 
This has two aspects. First, there is land suitable for irrigation for which irrigation water is 
not available under current levels of water management. For example, the U ^ D P / F A O 
Final Report on the Mahaweli Ganga Project states: 
" T h e surveys of the Scheme have revealed that soils suitable for irrigation ex-
tend over an area of about 1.5 million acres. The water resources available after 
full development (about 5.6 million acre feet per year) would however only be enough 
for year-round irrigation for about 0.9 million acres. In other words, the limiting 
factor is the availability of water and not of l and" (pp. 55-56). 
Opinions canvassed f r o m a number of knowledgeable people also suggest that under existing 
tanks there are often considerable areas suitable either for asweddumisation or for other 
forms of irrigation but for which irrigation water has not yet been available. Second, lack 
of water prevents the cultivation of land which has already been asweddumised, especially 
" I am very grateful to my colleagues and otffers who have generously helped with information, discussion and 
criticism. I am particularly indebted to C. M. Madduma Bandara, Kusuma Gunawardena and B W E 
Wickremanayakefor collaboration in devising, pretesting and analysing the UCART1 survey questions 
(Table 2 and 3) and to John Harriss forcntical comment. Responsibility for the views expressed is of course 
mine, and not that of any other person or of any institution. 
1. For a glossary of teims and definitions see Appendix 8.1. 
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of oniy 700 to 750 cusecs after twenty years without maintenance compared with a designed 
capacity for 1,145 cusecs. In major irrigation schemes, more generally, issues of 3 to 5 aa:e-
feet per acre for maha are common, as against reasonable field requirements of nil (relying, 
entirely on rainfall) to 3 acre-feet per acre. Wherever there are alternative uses for the water 
saved and water issues are larger than technically or practically needed, there is a production 
imperative for examining the possibility of a system of more sparing issues. 
The second aspect is the cluster of questions which includes the time period over which 
issues take place, the amounts of water issues to yayas, and staggered cultivation. The periods 
of issue are in practice rather long and are quite often extended beyond agreed dates because 
of pressure from farmers who have crops which still need water beyond the agreed terminal 
date. The questions of staggered cultivation which are involved here have a fascinating com-
plexity in which the observer can become entwined and even immobilised (for a case of partial 
immobilisation, see Chambers, 1974, 33-44). We must recognise that shortening the period 
of issue from a tank and reducing staggering can have harmful as well as beneficial effects. 
In particular, reduction of staggering may accentuate scarcities of traction power and of labour, 
penalising the smaller, poorer cultivators. The point which matters most, however, is that 
quite independently of such scarcities, staggered cultivation may be an unavoidable conse-
quence of permissive issues. This occurs when there are liberal issues f rom the channel to 
those yayas near the top-end as a result of which the arrival of water at the lower-end is delayed, 
sometimes (as on Walawe Right Bank) by over a month, sometimes (as in parts of Gal Oya) 
never arriving at all. Consequently, the extent to which traction power and labour con-
straints exist may never be put to the test. In such circumstances there is an imperative for 
more sparing issues to top-end yayas in order to enable (a) earlier, more reliable and more 
timely cultivation (with its associated higher yields) at the tail-end, and (b) where possible the 
cultivation of larger acreages at the tail-end. 
The case for more sparing issues f rom a tank into its channels and from the channels 
into the yayas can now be examined in relation to the strategies for water management and 
cultivation for the two main seasons. 
(1) The Yala Strategy 
The water strategy for yala is simple. As much water as possible f rom maha is saved 
in the tank; cultivation is timed to benefit from the yala rains, such as they are (a mean of 11 
inches for 12 Dry Zone rainfall stations);4 the acreage to be cultivated is nicely judged against 
the water available, the anticipated levels of water management, and perceived rainfall pro-
babilities; and then water issues take place. In practice the areas cultivated are sometimes 
too large for the water available, leading to failure or partial failure of the crop. Under a lax 
water management regime, water issues can be expected to be liberal at first only to become 
tighter as water becomes scarcer. The high risks involved under current management prac-
tices is suggested by the fact that a five year average of reported yields f rom dry zone districts 
(including minor and rainfed paddy) showed only a negligibly higher yield (49.4 bushels per 
acre) in yala than that (48.9 bushels per acre) in maha in spite of the higher yield potential of 
the climatic conditions in yala. 
There are persuasive arguments for improving yala in two ways. The first is by supple-
menting surface irrigation water by exploiting ground-water, as advocated by Madduma 
Bandara (1973, 1974). This could remove much of the risk f rom yala and also enable addit-
ional areas to be cultivated in that season. The second is, where soils are suitable, growing 
crops which are more water-sparing than paddy (see Jayasekera, 1973; Ranatunga and 
Izumi, 1974). Both these approaches appear important and to have considerable potential. 
But we may note that neither weakens the case for tighter water management in yala. To the 
contrary, they strengthen it. In the case of the use of ground-water, careful control measures 
may be desirable to limit or prevent the use of surface irrigation water on land for which 
4. For the table on which this is based sec Chambers, 1974, p. 12. Kurunegala has been excluded f rom the 
calculation which led to 11 inches on the grounds that its rainfall regime, with a mean of over 33 inches in 
yala, is not typical of the dry zone. 11 inches is a rounding of 10.87 inches. 
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ground-water is available. In the! dase of crojis other than paddy, touch closer water toaftage-
ment will be required anyway in order to avoid either drowning or desiccating the crop. 
Moreover, these two approaches are longer-term whereas improved water management for 
paddy could be implemented more quickly. 
In the meantime, the need remains to reduce the risk and if possible increase the acre-
age in yala. These ends may be achieved by administratively inducing an earlier crisis in 
yala thus reducing the risks of partial or total crop loss later and/or making it possible to 
cultivate a larger area. The imperative in yala is for even more stringent and carefully con-
trolled issues than at present. 
(2) The Maha Strategy 
Pursuing these lines of analysis it is a little surprising to find that it is the maha strategy 
which is more complex and important, although attention is usually focussed on yala as the 
time of greatest difficulty. In maha there is usually fairly abundant rain and no major prob-
lems in water issues and water management that can compare with those of yala. Yet, it is 
precisely at this time that water is wasted and options lost. This can be shown by considering 
the case of a dry zone tank with its present maha acreage. We can distinguish six categories 
of situation according to whether additional irrigable maha acreage is available under the 
tank, whether the tank spills in maha, and whether the spill water is wasted or used lower-
down. The six categories with their associated prescriptions can bepresented diagrammatically: 
CONDITION PRESCRIPTION 
Case Extra maha Tank spills Marginal spill- Sparing use of water in 
Number land available in maha water used Maha in order to 
beyond what lower-down Raise maha Save more Supply more 
is cultivated acreage water for yala water for use 
at present lower-down 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes N o Yes 
2 Yes Yes N o Yes N o No 
3 Yes No — Yes Yes N o 
4 N o Yes Yes N o N o Yes 
5 N o No — No Yes No 
6 N o Yes No N o No No 
In five out of the six cases there is an argument for more sparing issues of water in maha in 
order to enable a larger maha acreage to be cultivated, and/or to save more water for yala 
and/or to increase the supply to tanks lower-down. 
We may note in passing that where the choice lies between using the same water for 
additional maha cultivation or saving it for yala, the former is to be preferred on the grounds 
of a much higher productivity for that water. The order of magnitude [Chambers, 1974, 
pp. 26-32] with various qualifications, is a factor of four: that is to say, a given quantum of 
water available for additional maha cultivation will enable an area to be cultivated in maha 
which is very roughly four times as large as the area which that same water (after storage losses 
and with the lower yala rainfall, etc.) would be able to cultivate if saved for yala. 
Returning to the maha strategy, the question has to be asked as to how common is the 
sixth category where there appears to be no strong argument for more sparing issues of water. 
This deserves to be investigated empirically. In the meantime, opinions canvassed suggest 
that there often is an additional acreage which could be cultivated under major tanks in maha 
if the water were available. In addition, cases where marginal spill water is used downstream 
may be quite common (e.g. with chains of tanks). But also limiting the frequency with which 
situations in the sixth category may obtain is the question of probability. Tanks may spill 
some years but not others but for any particular year it is not known in advance whether 
they will spill or not. A tank may be in the sixth category one year but in the fifth category 
another year. This means that the argument for sparing use of water may apply to many 
165 
situations in the sixtfa category up until t i e tank spiils or at least up until it looks very pro-
bable that it will spill. The sixth category where the argument for sparing use of water does 
not apply is thus further reduced. There may be very few tanks in the sixth category for 
which probabilities of spilling in maha are high enough to justify permissive issues in the early 
stages of maha. 
Let us, however, take this perhaps rather extreme case of a tank in the sixth category 
which has no additional maha acreage to be cultivated, the spill water of which runs into the 
sea, and which spills regularly, let us say nine mahas out of ten. Does any case for stricter 
water management remain? At this stage we must refer back to the earlier points about 
length of channel and timeliness. If the tank has a long channel and if permissive issues 
near the top seriously delay the arrival of water at the bottom, then there may still be a case 
for more stringent water issues to the yayas at the top-end to enable cultivation to be more 
timely at the tail-end. 
It would be possible at this stage to be cautious and say that more information was 
required, surveys should be conducted, and so forth. Certainly there is much to be said for 
an early analysis of data on tanks to find out how many fall into which category and what, 
more precisely, the potential f rom tighter water issues may be. But in the meantime, paddy 
production is being foregone. And it is difficult to avoid the provisional conclusion that in 
most years most tanks in the dry zone are in the categories 1 to 5. If this is so, it means that 
he case for tightening water issues and/or for extending the maha acreage applies widely. 
There is indeed a complementarity between tightening issues and cultivating an addit-
ional maha acreage. To ensure that water reaches the tail-end (where most additional acreage 
can be expected to be found) rotational issues or at least smaller issues may be necessary to the 
yayas at the top-end. In categories 1 and 2 where extra maha land is available and the tank 
spills, water may not reach the tail-end if there are permissive abstractions higher up, or the 
water which reaches the tail-end may be inadequate or late or both. If the capacity of the 
channel is a constraint, then the need for stringent issues will be even greater. 
The general imperative here is that in most if not all dry zone conditions and in the 
interests of national food production, water issues from tanks into channels and from channels 
into yayas should be made more stringent and sparing in maha; that maha should, in short, 
be made more like yala. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
We can now try to follow through some implications of these imperatives, which, to 
summarise, require more sparing issues of water f rom tanks into channels and from channels 
into yayas in order: 
(i) to enable more timely and reliable cultivation in all seasons, especially at the 
tail-end; 
(ii) to make yala cultivation more reliable and increase the acreage; 
(i'i) to extend in maha the acreage and/or to save more water for yala and/or to save 
more water to increase the spill to be used further downstream. 
The central and cf-ucia! point is that implementing these imperatives will be unpopular 
with those cultivators who benefit f rom present permissiveness. Implementation would 
mean that those in top-end yayas who enjoy a relaxed maha might have to face shortages in 
maha which would make it more like yala; it would mean that those who at present can get 
away with planting a longer-duration paddy variety and then exercising pressure for an ex-
tended water issue to enable the crop to mature; would no longer be able to enjoy that ad-
vantage; it might mean in some cases that labour would have to be substituted for water in 
weeding; it would mean that intra-yaya friction and competition would be heightened, making 
it even more desirable that an equitable system of intra-yaya allocation be practised. It is 
important to recognise that the beneficiaries of more sparing issues are not the same people 
as those who lose. The losers are those (often politically vocal, perhaps) at the top-ends; 
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introduce bias, at least it should also ensure that he will be present when needed. As far as 
possible, too, he should be independent of local factions and interests. In practice, however, 
one has to accept that these ideals cannot always or perhaps even often be achieved. What 
does seem most important is that he should be vested with sufficient incentive, respect and 
power to be able effectively to allocate water and to arbitrate in and settle disputes within the 
yaya. The great variability in the attitudes of cultivators to current water management sys-
tems revealed in the UCARTI survey suggests that much depends on the individual personality 
of the Administrative Secretary. Very great care should be taken in the selection of such 
people. 
(2) Ex-sluice and Inter-yaya Allocations 
It is with ex-sluice and inter-yaya allocations and issues that we come to the most 
difficult questions. The decisions about ex-sluice and inter-yaya allocations are largely 
made by people in bureaucracies who also implement them. A person unlocks a padlock and 
raises or lowers a sluice which determines the amount of water flowing out of a tank, or raises 
or lowers boards which determine the amount of water which flows from a channel into a 
yaya. The client groups—the cultivators in each yaya—are often in competition with one 
another for the water. It is perfectly rational for water-users individually and in groups to 
try to increase their supply of water, since more water reduces the risks of drying out and crop 
damage or loss, makes cultivation easier, reduces weeding requirements, and may reduce 
interpersonal friction within a yaya. It is perfectly understandable and to be expected that 
yaya groups will bring pressure to bear on the water bureaucracy to give them more, and that 
they should use whatever means—pleading, political pressure, presents, bribery, physical 
threat, blackmail, assault—which lie in their power to induce them to issue more water. It 
is also understandable that they should resort to physical measures—poaching water from their 
neighbours, illicit tapping of channels, blocking other people's channels—to achieve the same 
end. 
It is also not surprising that water control staff, in these circumstances, weigh up the 
situation and, in the absence of countervailing incentives, decide to choose a quiet and perhaps 
modestly profitable life. The simplest course for them is to follow the policy of, to quote one 
observer: "You open the sluice and you go to sleep". No restrictions except those which 
are technically unassailable are exercised except where special inducements have been offered. 
Water is run into the channels at overload capacity until there is no more water. Water is 
issued to yayas at the maximum that the gates will take. Such practices make for a peaceful 
existence for water control staff but are disastrous for the national drive for food production. 
It is important here not to be unfair to the Executive Engineers, Technical Assistants, 
Watchers and others who are involved. They have nothing to gain and much to lose from 
adopting a policy of strict issues, of giving people less than they demand. For if they do that, 
they expose themselves to political risk which may damage their careers. To make it rational 
for them to take and enforce the unpopular measures which are in the national interest they 
must feel and be assured of political support from a high level which will override and overrule 
local political interests. 
An anecdote from another country illustrates what may be involved. One of the most 
junior members of an irrigation hierarchy was struck by a political leader for refusing to issue 
more water through a channel than his instructions permitted. The irrigation organisation 
took the case to court. The case was withdrawn only after the political leader had publicly 
apologised to the junior member of the irrigation hierarchy. The two points to note in this 
episode are first, that the junior staff member stood his ground in the face of what might in 
many circumstances have appeared a superior political authority; and second that he was 
supported by his organisation in the face of what must have been quite intense political pres-
sure at the local level. These two essential actions can only have been possible because: 
(i) the organisation had strong internal discipline; 
(ii) the organisation was confident of high-level political support. 
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These are, indeed, the two essential and complementary measures which are required 
if water issues are to be tightened and made more sparing, as they have to be in order to secure 
the benefits of stricter water management. It has to be made rational for the lowest and 
intermediate levels in the Territorial Civil Engineering Organisation (TCEO) which is a t pre-
sent responsible for administering water issues on major irrigation to do what is unpopular. 
This means a change in procedures and style. Within the organisation this requires: 
— stricter discipline; 
— closer supervision; 
— clear and specific instructions, preferably in writing, about water issues; 
— support for subordinates by superiors in the face of local pressures. 
What is required is not so much an organisation of technicians as an organisation with a 
quasi-military or quasi-police character in which staff are more concerned about the rewards 
and sanctions which come from their organisations than they are about the rewards and sanct-
ions which come from their clients. 
Such discipline, supervision, clear instructions and support within the organisation 
would be useless if it were not consistently backed at the highest political level. In the early 
stages, such backing would have to be public and visible, for example, in explicitly and 
emphatically supporting staff in a number of local situations in which they were carrying out 
unpopular measures which wpre, however, in the national interest. 
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS 
For the sake of a quiet life one might at this point like the rational staff who distribute 
irrigation water and abstain from pursuing the argument through to unpopular conclusions. 
But if the argument is correct so far, that would be a dereliction of responsibility. For in the 
face of an exceedingly bleak economic prospect it seems that there is a rather extraordinary 
opportunity for a major component of a strategy for increasing food production to rely almost 
entirely on domestic resources. 
The suggestions which follow are designed to open up the debate. Not all the mea-
sures are inter-dependent. Not all are of equal importance. But they are based upon the 
arguments and evidence presented above, although to avoid long-windedness the reasoning 
underlying them will not always be made explicit. The suggestions can be grouped under 
four headings: 
— land use; 
— yaya-level organisation; 
— higher organisation; 
— political. 
(1) Land Use 
(a) Legalise encroachments and incorporate them into the recognised irrigation system. 
Abandon the word "encroacher" and substitute "pioneer". It makes little or no sense to 
penalise those who through their initiative have increased food production. All pioneers 
should be eligible to attend and vote at water meetings, be entitled to loans, and in other 
respects be on an equal legal and institutional footing with other cultivators. 
(b) Encourage further pioneering following technical appraisals premised on tighter 
and more effective water management, including, where necessary, rotational issues to enable 
more water to reach further down channels. These appraisals might use aerial photographs 
and existing soil surveys. This pioneering would be mainly or entirely to increase the maha 
acreage. 
(c)i Encourage the sons of cultivators near the top-ends of irrigation systems to pioneer 
settlement lower down in order to establish family links which might moderate the conflicts of 
interest between topenders and tailenders. connicis 
no 
(2) Yava-level (Organisation i i u 
The crucial question is the selection of the headman who is to allocate water and td 
arbitrate in disputes. He should have the confidence of the cultivators but his selection should 
also be subject to moderation by an external impartial authority. There is no doubt that 
different systems would be used at different places at different times. One worth considering 
requires candidates for the post to make public election speeches to the assembled cultivators 
explaining how they would perform their duties, with an official committee also present. The 
choice would be made by election by the cultivators voting equally, but the committee would 
have a power of veto which, however, it would try not to use. In situations like this, various 
forms of sensible negotiation are possible to achieve a good outcome. 
(3) Higher Organisation 
(a) Introduce strict supervision and discipline in the organisation which controls water 
issues. An ideal might be to form a new organisation with staff drawn from those with the 
TCEO who have experience in water matters and from new recruitment. The senior officer 
in each district would be an executive engineer or a senior technical assistant. The senior 
officer in each district would be responsible to the Government Agent as the person best able 
to protect staff f rom partisan local political pressures. The Government Agent would be 
responsible to the Prime Minister for the resolute and impartial discharge of irrigation res-
ponsibilities. 
If a new organisation could not be formed, the task would be more difficult. It would 
involve a change of style within one part of the TCEO while leaving the remainder unchanged. 
(b) Retain and strengthen water meetings. The present system of water meetings 
chaired by the impartial Government Agent appears admirably suited to some of the needs 
of the situation. However, it is not normally concerned with determining the amounts of 
water that should be issued. As and when it is feasible, and subject to local conditions, 
Government Agents should try to extend discussion and guidance towards questions of 
volumes of water to be issued. Insofar as water meetings can understand and approve 
more stringent water issues, they should be encouraged to do so. 
(c) Create a representative working committee for each major irrigation tank. The 
large attendances at water meetings reduce their usefulness for detailed decisions. Moreover, 
attendance may be haphazard and some interests may be under-represented. Further, 
quick decisions are needed in the course of a Season. A working committee chosen to re-
present "irrigation constituencies", ensuring adequate representation to those at the tail-end 
has much to recommend it. Such a committee could work with the Government Agent or 
his representative and other staff in making the continuing series of decisions required for 
sparing water management. In any case where an Agricultural Productivity Committee is 
truly representative of irrigation constituency interests, it might be able to perform this funct-
ion; but its many other responsibilities would probably reduce its effectiveness. An entirely 
separate body, ad hoc for each major irrigation system, appears to be indicated. 
(d) Maintain a stricter adherence to cultivation calendars and maintenance schedules. 
Many questions are involved here, and an engineer's rigid adherence to pre-determined sche-
dules may be as damaging as a politician's readiness to vary them. The Government Agent 
should be able to maintain a reasonable balance between these extremes. 
(e) Repair damaged control structures and improve communications. These are the 
only measures which may involve foreign exchange. They are a high priority and antecedent 
to tightening water issues. Without padlocks and gates, and their regular replacement as and 
when they are damaged, water control as envisaged is impossible. 
(f) Prosecute infringements. A distinction should be made between on the one hand 
those pioneers who have illegally brought additional land under cultivation, and who should 
in most cases be legalised and brought officially into the system; and on the other those who 
infringe the measures taken to regulate the water distribution system, who should be resolutely 
and quickly prosecuted. These are those who tap water at night, steal their neighbours' 
water, place obstructions in channels, and so on. Prosecution should be so prompt and 
effective that it ceases to be worthwhile to indulge in these practices. 
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V. POLITICAL 
These measures would be ineffective without political support from the highest level. 
It is for this reason that it is suggested that Government Agents should be responsible direct 
to the Prime Minister for water management matters. The water reform proposed would be 
unpopular with some interest groups, notably those at the top-end, though it should be popu-
lar with those at the tail-ends. The implementation of the proposals would only be possible 
if the civil servants concerned saw it as more in their interests to do what was locally unpopular 
but in the national interest, than to capitulate to local pressures. Discipline within the or-
ganisation could provide only part of that incentive; the other part would have to be provided 
by .a conviction that necessary but unpopular decisions and actions would receive support, 
in the face of opposition, from the highest political level. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Other things being equal, the outcome of a resolutely sustained campaign for stricter 
water management in the major irrigation schemes in the dry zone should be higher yields per 
acre and per unit of water (from more timely cultivation and from a more reliable supply of 
water) and also the cultivation of larger acreages in both maha and yala. There are so many 
imponderables that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to make a secure estimate of the poten-
tially feasible increase in paddy production. It would be much easier to gauge if a few tanks 
were designated pilot projects for the closer management proposed. In order to appreciate 
orders of magnitude, however, we can start with the estimate of 20 to 25 million bushels per 
annum being produced from major irrigation in the dry zone. Additional production under 
different assumptions is shown in Table 8.4. 
TABLE 8.4 
INCREASES IN PADDY PRODUCTION F R O M DRY Z O N E M A J O R IRRIGATION -
UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS (million bushels) 
Estimated base of dry Increase in output if Increase in output if 
zone production from (at current yields) yields increase in 
major Irrigation acreage cultivated is currently cultivated 
increased— areas — 
by 10 by 20 by 10 by 20 
percent percent percent percent 
20 million bushels . . 2.0 4.0 ' 2.0 4.0 
25 million bushels . . 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0 
If the increase in cultivated acreage was in the range of 10 to 20 percent, and if the 
percentage increase in yields on the presently cultivated area was also in the range of 10 to 20 
percent, then the increase in production would be between 4 million bushels (combining all 
the lowest assumptions) and 10 million bushels (combining all the highest assumptions). 
If 20 percent increases in acreage and yields could both be achieved, then the additional pro-
duction would exceed that which may be anticipated at current standards of water manage-
ment from the Mahaweli Ganga project by 1980. Substituting political and administrative 
will for foreign exchange through better water management is less visibly dramatic than 
.building a huge new irrigation system; but it may achieve as much or more in production and 
in steps to self-sufficiency in food, may achieve it more quickly, and has the supreme advantage 
of involving negligible costs in foreign exchange. 
These estimates may be low or high. To improve them requires field testing. At the 
very least, if the evidence and arguments presented are correct, there is a strong case for ex-
perimental pilot projects in stricter water control in order to gain further experience. While 
the productivity aspects of such organisational experiments are obviously very important, the 
social equity aspects could also be monitored. There is a danger with any rural reform that it 
will be captured and exploited by a local elite to the disadvantage of those who are less power-
ful and less well-off. The aim should be to design the irrigation organisation and its manage-
ment so that both equity and higher production could be achieved. 
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APPENDIX 8.1 — G L O S S A R Y AND DEFINITION O F T E R M S 
Channel : refers to canals, branch canals, distributaries and feeders down to the level of the yaya, but 
no t within yayas. 
Ex-sluice : refers to water allocations and issues f rom a tank into a channel. 
Inter-yaya : refers to the relationship between different yayas. 
Intra-yaya : refers to relationships within a yaya. 
Maha : the period of cultivation during the northeast (and I arger) monsoon. 
TCEO : Territorial Civil Engineering Organisation. 
UCARTI : University of Cambridge and Agrarian Research and Training Institute Project on Agrarian 
Change. 
Yala : the period of cultivation during the southwest (and smaller) monsoon. 
Yaya : refers to a paddy tract on major irrigation which is supplied f rom one point controlled by 
the irrigation bureaucracy. 
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